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In this article, I survey four key questions about willpower: How is willpower possible? Why does
willpower fail? How does willpower relate to other self-regulatory processes? and What are the
connections between willpower and weakness of will? Empirical research into willpower is grow-
ing rapidly and yielding some fascinating new findings. This survey emphasizes areas in which
empirical progress in understanding willpower helps to advance traditional philosophical debates.
1. Introduction
Consider the dieter who so much wants to lose weight, but when the dessert cart rolls
by, succumbs. Or the lush who promises himself that he will have just one glass of wine,
but in the end can not resist having a second and a third. Or even the 10th year graduate
student who is supposed to be writing her dissertation, but caves in when her friends
pressure to her to go to the party. Folk practice explains the failure of these agents to
achieve what they had originally set out to do in terms of the absence or insufficiency of
willpower. But what exactly is willpower and how does it work? Asking this question
immediately raises fascinating issues at the intersection of philosophy and a number of
adjoining empirical disciplines including psychology, neuroscience, and psychiatry. This
article surveys four key questions about the nature of willpower that are particularly inter-
esting from a philosophical perspective. Some of the questions posed in this survey are
addressed in the current literature in only formative or tentative ways. Thus, this survey
of the literature also serves as an agenda for future research.
Question 1: How is Self-Control Possible? How can the Self Control Itself?
Common sense understands willpower as a form of self-control. An agent exercising
willpower attenuates or suppresses one of her own desires, or in some other way prevents
that desire from winning control over action. Willpower is a form of synchronic self-
control. In this form of self-control, an occurrent desire is prevented from prevailing in
action. Synchronic self-control can be contrasted with diachronic control, in which an
agent seeks to prevent some non-occurrent future desire from driving action. For exam-
ple, suppose right now Charlie most desires to stay on his diet and he does not have a
desire to eat a slice of cake. But he knows that were he to go to the pastry shop with his
friends, the sight of the cherry chocolate cake would trigger a desire for the cake to
which he is sure he will succumb. So Charlie decides to stay at home rather than go to
the pastry shop with his friends, and in this way ensures that the desire to eat the cherry
chocolate cake will not be triggered. But in preventing this potential future desire from
becoming active and prevailing in action, Charlie does not exercise willpower.
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Willpower, as a species of synchronic self-control, requires that the desire that is rendered
motivationally inefficacious be active at the very time willpower is exercised.
Some philosophers have found the idea of synchronic self-control (and a fortiori, exer-
cises of willpower) puzzling. The starting place for this puzzle is the observation that
there is a tight connection between what an agent most desires to do and what an agent
will do. We can put this idea in a slightly more rigorous form:
(1) If an agent most desires to perform some action x, and if she believes herself free to x, then
she will x, if she does anything at all intentionally.
If we grant (1), then this leads to a dilemma about willpower1 that we can illustrate by
means of another example. Suppose Charlie is on a diet, but one evening he goes to the
pastry shop with his friends. Now he finds his strongest desire is to eat an enormous slice
of cherry chocolate cake. If eating the cake is indeed his strongest desire, then how can
Charlie exercise willpower to try to not eat the cake? Given (1), and given that exercis-
ing willpower is not what Charlie most desires, then Charlie will eat the cake and will
not exert willpower to try to not eat the cake. But suppose then, and this takes us to the
other horn of the dilemma, that eating the cake is not Charlie’s strongest desire. That is,
Charlie has a strong desire to eat the cake, but the desire to stay on his diet remains his
strongest desire. In this case, there doesn’t seem to be any need for willpower. Given (1),
and given that staying on the diet remains Charlie’s strongest desire, then Charlie will stay
on his diet. There is no special need to invoke the exercise of willpower to explain why
Charlie stays on his diet and does not eat the cake.
One solution to this ‘puzzle of synchronic self-control’ is to deny that exercises of
willpower are properly called actions. According to Jeannette Kennett and Michael Smith
(Kennett and Smith, ‘Frog and Toad Lose Control’; Kennett and Smith, ‘Synchronic Self-
Control Is Always Non-Actional’), willpower consists in an agent’s dispositions to have
certain thoughts – thoughts that highlight certain considerations while deemphasizing
others, thus overall enhancing (or blunting) the strengths of the agent’s desires. For exam-
ple, at the moment that Charlie most desires to eat the chocolate cake, suppose Charlie
experienced thoughts that the cake is a large lump of fat accompanied by images of the fat
curdling in his stomach. The occurrence of ‘desire-modifying thoughts’ such as these
would weaken Charlie’s desire to eat the cake and in this way allow Charlie’s desire
to stay on his diet to prevail. Now, if Charlie needed to act to bring about these desire-
modifying thoughts, then the puzzle of synchronic self-control would arise anew and we
might wonder how Charlie can be motivated to summon up these desire-modifying
thoughts when his strongest desire is to eat the cake. But, according to Kennett and
Smith, desire-modifying thoughts are not brought about by means of an agent’s actions.
Rather, thoughts such as these are happenings, and they are disposed to happen in a partic-
ular agent at a particular time precisely to the degree that that agent is rational at that time.
Because desire-modifying thoughts are not the products of actions that Charlie undertakes,
Charlie can experience desire-modifying thoughts that counteract his motivation to eat
the cherry chocolate cake, even when the desire to eat the cake is his strongest desire.
A potential problem for Kennett and Smith is that it seems perfectly possible for a per-
son to intentionally call to mind desire-modifying thoughts at the time of temptation, and
to do so for the deliberate purpose of attenuating the temptation-directed desire. Indeed,
it is the hallmark of certain forms of psychotherapy (Beck; Beck et al.) that a person should
deliberately challenge thoughts associated with problematic emotions and desires. A second
approach to the puzzle of synchronic self-control that perhaps does a better job in making
sense of active exertions of willpower is based on the idea that the mind is partitioned into
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distinct motivational compartments. While philosophers have historically pursued ‘divided
mind’ approaches that are rooted in Platonic and Freudian (Davidson) thinking, an
updated version of a divided mind view might be naturally developed using the resources
of dual-process models in contemporary psychology (Chaiken and Trope 1999; Kahneman),2
which are now well-accepted as explanations for how information processing in the
mind ⁄brain is organized in a host of domains (e.g., Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly; Slo-
man; Stanovich and West; Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman).
In general form, a dual-process model postulates that information processing in some
psychological domain is subserved by two distinct systems. One system (often referred to
as ‘system 1’, the terminology is from Stanovich and West) is relatively fast, automatic,
performs relatively simple associative operations, and has access to only limited informa-
tion. The other system (often referred to as ‘system 2’) is slow, consciously controlled,
uses linguistic ⁄ logical representations, and has access to much larger and more global
stores of information. An additional feature of dual-process models is that they typically
postulate that domain-relevant information is processed by both systems 1 and 2 simulta-
neously. Perhaps most crucial for our purposes, at least some kinds of dual-process models
propose that when these two systems diverge in terms of their outputs, system 2 can exert
regulatory control over system 1 (Gilbert). That is, the two systems are related by an inhibi-
tion mechanism activated by system 2 that overrides, suppresses, or modulates outputs
from system 1.
Many theorists from diverse parts of the behavioral sciences have developed dual-pro-
cess models of motivation in which, very roughly, emotions and urges occupy the role of
system 1, while planning ⁄practical reasoning systems occupy the role of system 2 (Met-
calfe and Mischel; Loewenstein; Bechara; Sanfey et al.; Hofmann, Friese, and Strack). If
we accept these theorists’ suggestions that a dual-process structure underlies decision-
making and motivation, then we have a natural way of addressing the puzzle of syn-
chronic self-control. Suppose that two distinct motivational compartments within Charlie
reach divergent motivational verdicts about what Charlie should do. The strongest desire
within the ‘system 1’ compartment is that Charlie should eat the cake. The strongest
desire within the ‘system 2’ compartment is that Charlie should stay on his diet. On this
picture, willpower is naturally understood as the regulatory control mechanism by which
the system 2 compartment suppresses or overrides the system 1 compartment. The
divided mind model circumvents the puzzle of synchronic self-control because there is
no single agent who both most wants to eat the cake and simultaneously most wants to
resist eating the cake. Rather, within the system 2 compartment, the strongest desire is to
stay on the diet, and this system initiates and maintains willpower. The desire to eat the
cake is strongest only in a distinct motivational compartment, and this second compart-
ment is not the agent that initiates and maintains willpower, but rather the patient whose
motivational force is suppressed by willpower.
The idea that willpower is a mental action initiated by one part of a divided mind
appears either explicitly (Baumeister, Heatherton, and Tice; Loewenstein), or implicitly
in much of the recent psychological literature on the subject. The divided mind picture
is also attractive because it captures many common sense features of willpower, such as that
in situations like Charlie’s the agent feels divided, there is an active inner struggle
between parts of the agent, and willpower is an action performed for the express purpose
of curtailing the wayward desire. But the divided mind view also raises many questions
about how agency should be understood given such a picture. For example, if the
divided mind view is correct, then exercises of willpower aren’t truly performed by the
agent as a whole, but rather are undertaken by only part of the agent in which only a
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strict subset of the agent’s full set of desires are active. Common sense understands actions
as typically brought about by the agent, not part of the agent, so the existence of ‘sub-per-
sonal actions’ of this sort requires a careful philosophical defense and explication. Another
question concerns the notion of an agent’s strongest desire. While there are different
accounts of how to understand this notion even on a picture of the mind that is not
divided [see, for example, the discussion in (Mele, Motivation and Agency Ch. 7)], an addi-
tional set of problems emerge on a divided mind picture. Since on this view, there are
two motivational compartments, there are hence two strongest desires (one in each com-
partment), and it is unclear which of these desires should be regarded as the agent’s stron-
gest desire. Thus, a divided mind picture, although attractive in some respects, surely
raises as many questions as it answers.3
Question 2: Why Does Willpower Fail?
It is plausible that some failures of willpower are due to insufficient motivation. Suppose
Charlie and Marley both decide to go on a diet. Charlie’s desire to stay on the diet is
very strong as he is deeply worried about dire health consequences that will occur if he
fails to keep to his diet. Marley’s desire to stay on the diet is not so strong – he started
the diet in a moment of vanity and while he wants to be a bit thinner, he has no other
motivation for wanting to maintain the diet. One day both go to the pastry shop and
each considers having a slice of his beloved cherry chocolate cake. Charlie puts vigorous
effort into resisting the desire to eat the cake, with success – he leaves the shop with his
diet intact. Marely puts only perfunctory effort into resisting the desire to eat the cake,
and in the end, fails – he eats an embarrassingly large slice of cake. Here, it is plausible
that Marley’s failure in his attempt at willpower owes to the fact that his desire to stay on
the diet is relatively weak, thus making him correspondingly only weakly motivated to
exercise willpower in resisting a contrary desire.
The case of Charlie and Marley raises the question of whether in all cases in which
willpower fails, the explanation can be traced back to deficiencies in the strength of the
agent’s motivation to exercise willpower. Suppose instead that our story above ends with
Charlie too succumbing to temptation and eating a large piece of cake. Would the fact
that Charlie succumbs to temptation permit the inference that, despite appearances, Charlie
is in fact only weakly motivated, or at least insufficiently motivated, to stay on his diet?
An inference of this sort might be blocked if at least some failures of willpower are due
not to insufficiency in an agent’s underlying motivation to exercise willpower, but rather
stem from relatively ‘fixed ceilings’ on the efficacy of the willpower process itself. Rich-
ard Holton offers a helpful analogy with a runner’s speed to help separate these two
notions (Holton 132). If you want to know how fast a runner can run a mile, you will
need to know the runner’s motivational state, since wanting to run faster usually translates
into greater running velocity. But this relationship only holds over a certain range. Once
a threshold of speed is crossed, additional motivation to run faster will not lead to greater
speed. Even if the agent wants to run 100 miles per hour more than anything at all, his
speed cannot exceed the ceiling established by the physical condition of his body. More-
over, this ceiling is relatively fixed, in that if it is changeable at all, it is only changeable
through specific training processes that typically extend over long periods of time.
A broadly similar distinction may be applicable in the case of willpower. In particular,
we must distinguish the motivational ‘inputs’ into the mechanisms that implement will-
power from fixed ceilings in the efficacy of these mechanisms themselves. Motivation
certainly provides part of the explanation for whether willpower will succeed or fail.
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Marley, who is only weakly motivated to resist his wayward desire is, other things being
equal, more likely to fail at resistance than Charlie. But the mechanisms that implement
willpower may also exhibit fixed ceilings in their efficacy that obtain independently of
the agent’s motivation. Much like the runner for whom motivation alone will not permit
speeds of 100 miles per hour, motivation alone may not permit an agent to resist a suffi-
ciently strong wayward desire.
Some philosophers and legal theorists have been skeptical of the idea that there are
fixed ceilings in the efficacy of willpower that hold, irrespective of the agent’s motivation
to resist.
Strictly speaking no impulse is irresistible; for every case of giving in to a desire… it will be true
that, if the person tried harder, he would have resisted it successfully… Human endurance puts
a severe limit on how long one can stay afloat in an ocean, but there is no comparable limit to
our ability to resist temptation. (Feinberg 283)
Folk practice sometimes uses analogies with muscles, fatigue, and endurance to character-
ize how there might be fixed ceilings in the efficacy of willpower. For example, a person
exercising willpower to battle a temptation-directed desire might say ‘It overpowered
me’, ‘I could not fight it off’, or ‘I held out for a long time, but in the end it got the best
of me’. In the passage above, Feinberg appears to reject this analogy, as he denies that
limitations on willpower can be likened to the limits on endurance that are associated
with muscular activity. However, recent studies in psychology suggest that the muscle
analogy may in fact be an apt one. A number of researchers including Roy Baumeister,
Todd Heatherton, Diane Tice, Kathleen Vohs and their colleagues have systematically
examined a family of processes that they call ‘self-regulatory processes’, which are closely
related to, but in many ways broader than the notion of willpower discussed in this arti-
cle (Baumeister and Heatherton). (The relationship between self-regulatory processes and
willpower will be taken up in the following section.) According to these researchers, self-
regulatory processes can be characterized in terms of a ‘strength’ model (Baumeister
et al.). The basic idea behind the model is that like the strength associated with a muscle,
self-regulatory processes fatigue when exerted for prolonged periods of time. With rest,
however, these processes regain their effectiveness. Over longer periods of time, the regu-
lar use of self-regulatory processes can lead to enhancements in their efficacy.
These researchers explored various aspects of the fatigability of self-regulatory processes
by performing a number of experiments that have a characteristic structure (Fig. 1). Each
experiment has two phases and the second phase occurs shortly after the first. In the first
phase, one group of subjects is given a task that demands the use of self-regulatory pro-
cesses. Examples of such tasks include inhibiting the tendency to read subtitles during a
Fig. 1. Schematic structure of ‘self-regulation experiments’. Results suggest that subjects in Group 1 depleted their
self-regulatory capacities during the first task, thus leaving them less able to exert regulatory control during the sec-
ond task.
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movie, regulating one’s emotions during a disturbing film, restraining the urge to eat a
tempting food, suppressing thoughts with a certain content, resisting the urge to remove
one’s hand from a tank of extremely cold water, and maintaining one’s concentration on
a difficult- or impossible-to-solve puzzle. The second group of subjects is given a task
matched in most respects to the task performed by the first group, but which does not
demand the use of self-regulatory processes (e.g., subjects might watch the same film as
the first group, but be allowed to read the subtitles). Both groups then perform a second
task (distinct from the first task) that demands the use of self-regulatory processes. A
robust and consistent finding across dozens of these experiments is that in the second
phase of the experiment, the first group of subjects performs significantly worse than the
second group of subjects. The authors’ interpretation of this result is that the subjects in
the first group deplete their self-regulatory capacities during the task in the first phase of
the experiment, thus leaving them less able to exert regulatory control during the task in
the second phase of the experiment.
If the strength model of willpower endorsed by these researchers is correct, then this
would seem to put pressure on Feinberg’s claim that the capacity to resist a temptation is
limited only by one’s motivation to resist, and never by fixed ceilings on the efficacy of
the resistance mechanism. But we must be careful not to interpret the results of these
‘self-regulation’ experiments in ways that go beyond what the data can actually support.
These self-regulation experiments only demonstrate that willpower has certain properties
of a muscle – most importantly the property of exhibiting diminished efficacy immedi-
ately following sustained use. But if further research can deepen the analogy between
willpower and muscular activity,4 and in particular can provide direct evidence that will-
power too exhibits fixed ceilings in its efficacy that hold independent of the motivation
to exercise willpower, then Feinberg’s claim would indeed be seriously challenged.
Question 3: How Many ‘Willpowers’ are there? What is the Relationship Between Willpower and
Other Self-Regulatory Processes?
In the experiments by Baumeister and colleagues described in the previous section,
researchers used the term ‘self-regulatory process’ to describe a family of processes that
exhibit a common structure: these processes, once engaged, cause some ‘target mental
state’ to be attenuated, blocked or rendered inefficacious. Willpower, narrowly construed,
is a species of self-regulatory process where the target mental state is one of the agent’s
desires. Other self-regulatory processes attenuate or suppress a variety of other target
mental states such as thoughts, emotions, urges, cravings, attentional distractions, and
habitual or ‘prepotent’ responses.
A question then arises as to how willpower, understood narrowly as a capacity to inhi-
bit one of the agent’s own desires, relates to the broader family of self-regulatory pro-
cesses. One hypothesis is that these various different kinds of self-regulatory processes are
each implemented by largely distinct, although perhaps partially overlapping, neural
mechanisms. One method for testing this hypothesis involves studying a variety of tasks,
each one relatively selective in engaging just one kind of self-regulatory process. By
studying multiple such tasks, it might be possible to ‘parse’ self-regulation into compo-
nent processes.
For example, the Stroop task (MacLeod) is often used to probe attention regulation mech-
anisms involved in suppressing distractions. In this task (Fig. 2a), subjects are given a ser-
ies of words and asked to state the ink color of the word. But the words themselves are
names of colors, and the ink color and named color are often different. Hence, to per-
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form successfully, subjects must avoid being distracted by the word’s meaning and instead
focus their attention on the ink color of the word. In the delay discounting task (Myerson
and Green; Frederick, Loewenstein, and O’Donoghue), subjects are given choices
between smaller, earlier or larger, later monetary rewards (Fig. 2b). One influential
hypothesis holds that choices for later rewards depend on the engagement of appetitive reg-
ulation processes that suppress the ‘default’ tendency to choose more immediate rewards.
In emotion regulation tasks (Ochsner et al.), subjects are confronted with emotionally salient
stimuli, such as a highly disturbing picture, and asked to subjectively distance themselves
from the picture (e.g., they might be asked to take a detached third-person perspective
toward a frightening picture, Fig. 2c). This task is thought to engage processes specialized
for attenuating responses to emotionally valenced stimuli. By systematically investigating
performance in these three tasks, using a variety of methods such as reaction time, elec-
trophysiology, or neuroimaging, it might be possible to determine interrelationships
between the mechanisms implementing attention regulation, appetitive regulation, and
emotion regulation. Overall, investigations aimed at parsing self-regulatory processing into
component mechanisms (Friedman and Miyake; Ochsner and Gross; Wager et al.; Nee,
Wager, and Jonides) are still at the early stages, but this area of research is one of the
most active in cognitive neuroscience and promises to yield exciting results in the future.
Even if it is discovered that distinct neural mechanisms implement different forms of
self-regulatory processing, these various and sundry mechanisms may nonetheless rely on
a common energetic store. This hypothesis is supported by the self-regulatory experi-
ments of Baumeister and colleagues. Recall that the range of tasks utilized in these exper-
iments appears, at least superficially, to be quite heterogeneous. Nonetheless, subjects’
engagement in one kind of task reliably leads to poorer performance on a subsequent
task. If the processes engaged in these varied tasks all draw upon a common energetic
store, one could naturally explain why prolonged engagement in any one of these tasks
leads to subsequent poorer performance in any other.
Suppose that all self-regulatory processes exhibit a fixed ceiling on their efficacy, per-
haps due to their reliance on a common energetic store (see Note 3), or perhaps for some
other reason. This ‘single ceiling thesis’ calls into question certain arguments and distinc-
tions that are frequently found in the philosophy and legal theory literature. For example,
the legal theorist Stephen Morse has argued in a number of papers (Morse, ‘Culpability
and Control’; Morse, ‘Hooked on Hype: Addiction and Responsibility; Morse, ‘Uncon-
trollable Urges and Irrational People’) that persons addicted to drugs do not deserve an
excuse for actions in violation of the law based on irresistible desires. Roughly, his argu-
(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 2. Examples of tasks that are hypothesized to selectively engage distinct self-regulatory processes. (a) The
Stroop Task in which subjects must state the ink color of the word rather than read the name of the color; (b) the
Delay Discounting Task in which subjects choose between smaller, earlier versus larger, later monetary rewards; (c)
a picture from an emotion regulation task in which subjects use ‘distancing’ strategies to attenuate responses to
the emotional stimulus.
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ment is that the idea that one’s own desires ‘internally coerce’ one’s behavior, once care-
fully examined, cannot be made sense of. However, more recently, Morse has argued that
addicts do deserve an excuse, not due to irresistible desires, but rather due to the manner
in which addiction impairs one’s ‘rational capacities’.
…the addict, metaphorically, and in some cases perhaps literally, can think of nothing else but
the desire to use the substance. One informant described the desire like ‘‘a buzzing in my ears
that prevents me from focusing.’’ … There is only one tune or story in the addict’s head and
nothing can drive it out… Fundamental components of rationality – the capacities to think
clearly and self-consciously to evaluate one’s conduct – are compromised (Morse, ‘Hooked on
Hype: Addiction and Responsibility’ 39).
In the preceding paragraph, Morse seems to be suggesting that addiction excuses certain
behaviors in virtue of its generating irresistible thoughts, i.e., the addict can think about
nothing but obtaining the drug and these thoughts are incredibly hard to redirect or sup-
press. But it is not at all clear why Morse thinks irresistible thoughts and irresistible
desires are on such different footings, so that the former are a proper basis for legal excuse
but the latter are not. For one thing, given Morse’s careful and exhaustive enumeration
of reasons to doubt that one’s own desires are ever truly irresistible, one wonders why
these very same arguments don’t apply to thoughts, thus showing that one’s own
thoughts are never truly outside of one’s own control. A second potential problem for
Morse is that his argument relies on an implicit distinction between the psychological
mechanisms that enable one to control one’s thoughts and attention versus those that
enable one to control one’s desires, such that impairments in the former are deserving of
excuse but impairments in the latter are not. But it is unclear from Morse’s writings in
what this crucial difference consists. Indeed, if the ‘single ceiling thesis’ is correct that all
self-regulatory processes (including processes that regulate desire as well as processes that
regulate thought and attention) exhibit a common, fixed limit on their efficacy, then it
stands to reason that these two categories of self-regulatory failure, although they may
superficially appear quite different, should in fact be treated very much the same.
Morse’s endorsement of mitigation for addicts based on impairments in rational capaci-
ties, but not on the basis of irresistible desires, reflects a widespread tendency for the law
to treat irresistible impulses and other ‘motivation-related’ bases of excuse as less justified
than putatively strictly ‘cognitive’ bases of excuse (Goldstein; Caplan). A fully fleshed out
account of willpower that clarifies the relationship between willpower (which, per defini-
tion, is directed at regulating desires) and related processes directed at regulating thoughts
and attention might call into question the strong preference for cognitive bases of excuse
currently embraced in the law and in legal thinking.
Question 4: What is the Relationship Between Willpower and Weakness of Will (and Compul-
sion)?
On one well-accepted formulation, an agent’s action is weak-willed if the agent freely
and intentionally acts contrary to her all things considered judgment of what it would be
best to do (Stroud and Tappolet). In a highly influential paper (Watson), Gary Watson
raises skeptical questions about whether a weak-willed agent is in fact genuinely able to
resist her contrary desires, and in doing so, Watson forges a close link between philo-
sophical accounts of weakness of will and accounts of willpower. Watson presents three
versions of a case in which a woman who ought not to drink because of some obligation,
nonetheless drinks.
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(1) the reckless or self-indulgent case; (2) the weak case; and (3) the compulsive case. In (1),
the woman knows what she is doing but accepts the consequences. Her choice is to get drunk
or risk getting drunk. She acts in accordance with her judgment. In (2) the woman knowingly
takes the drink contrary to her (conscious) better judgment; the explanation for this lack of self-
control is that she is weak-willed. In (3), she knowingly takes the drink contrary to her better
judgment, but she is a victim of a compulsive (irresistible) desire to drink (Watson 324).
Watson argues that according to the ‘common sense’ account of weakness of will, the
weak case is like the compulsive case in that the agent acts contrary to her best judgment.
But the weak case is like the reckless case in that the agent has the ability to resist, but
fails to exercise it. But given that the weak agent is strongly (if not decisively) motivated
to resist, this motivation arising from her all things considered best judgment, and given
that she is able to resist, why does she fail in exercising resistance?
Watson considers a number of candidate answers to this question, such as that the
weak agent does not want to go through the trouble of resisting, or that the weak agent
underestimates the effort that would be needed to successfully resist. In each case, careful
analysis finds the explanation clearly wanting. Since no basis can be found for why an
agent who is both motivated and able to resist nonetheless fails to make the requisite
effort at resistance, Watson argues that we are entitled to conclude that the common
account of weakness of will is in fact critically mistaken – the weak-willed agent, at the
time that she capitulated to her wayward desire, was in fact unable to resist (p. 338).
Watson’s skeptical view is certainly controversial, and other writers (Buss; Mele, Irratio-
nality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Self-Control; Tenenbaum; Mele, ‘Akratics
and Addicts’) have reached an opposed conclusion. It will not be possible to discuss all
the arguments and counterarguments in this debate. Instead, here I want to focus on the
observation that there is a strong tendency to find the Watsonian skeptical position simply
unsatisfying as a resolution to the question ‘Is weakness of the will possible?’, and the long
list of authors opposed to Watson’s conclusion attests to this claim. Moreover, it is likely
that this dissatisfaction is rooted in the fact that common sense not only holds strongly to
the idea that weak-willed actions are possible, but it also in fact insists that they routinely
occur. But why might common sense be so insistent on the truth of these claims? Alfred
Mele provides a succinct answer.
Why do ordinary folks believe that there are (in this author’s terminology, not theirs) strict
akratic actions? Presumably, largely because they take themselves to have first hand experience
of such action and partly because some of their observations of others indicate to them they are
not alone in this… It is possible that these ordinary agents are wrong about this, of course…
But why should one believe that they are wrong? (Mele, ‘Akratics and Addicts’ 159)
Mele suggests that one important source of the folk belief that weak-willed actions occur
is ‘first-hand experience’.5 It is not exactly clear what Mele has in mind, but one plausi-
ble interpretation of ‘first-hand experience’ is in terms of the phenomenology associated
with putatively weak-willed action. When a person caves in to temptation, the person
experiences a distinctive suite of subjective experiences. For example, consider Charlie
who is on a diet but feels tempted to eat a slice of cherry chocolate cake. As Charlie
caves in to temptation, he experiences a characteristic phenomenology. His experiences
typically include a feeling of attraction directed at the chocolate cake, a feeling of effort as he
tries to resist eating the cake, and, eventually, the feeling of giving in to temptation. Most
important for our purposes, as Charlie gives in to temptation, the resulting action is often
accompanied by a ‘feeling of uncompelledness’. This feeling is difficult to articulate, but very
roughly, Charlie feels the action is not forced on him by a source external to him.
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Rather, he feels that he is the author of the action, and the action is a consequence of his
choosing. So one way of understanding Mele’s claim that the folk have ‘first-hand experi-
ence’ of weak-willed action is that people often have a feeling of uncompelledness when
they undertake actions that contravene their best judgment. This feeling ‘depicts’ their
action to themselves as free and intentional. In this way, people come to believe that
there are weak-willed actions.
I think there is something right about the proposal that the ‘feeling of uncompelled-
ness’ is the central underpinning for the folk belief that weak-willed actions routinely
occur. But if this is so, then it points to an important goal for philosophical research into
the nature of willpower. In particular, there is a pressing need to answer the question of
whether the feeling of uncompelledness that routinely accompanies certain kinds of fail-
ure of willpower is veridical. That is, when an agent experiences a feeling of uncompelled-
ness as she performs an action that contravenes her best judgment, is this feeling of
uncompelledness accurate in the way that it represents the agent as acting freely, inten-
tionally, and without compulsion?
One place to look in beginning to answer this question is the growing literature in
philosophy and neuroscience about the subjective experience of willed action (Bayne and
Levy; Bayne; Haggard). This literature is beginning to illuminate some of the brain
mechanisms by which various experiences associated with agency (such as the experience
of authorship, and the feeling of doing) become ‘attached’ to actions. A key lesson from
this literature is that there are multiple ways in which the mechanisms that link actions
with authorship experiences can misfire, so that some actions that the agent in fact
authors are not tagged with authorial experiences, while other actions the agent does not
fully author are inappropriately tagged. The feeling of uncompelledness associated with
weak-willed actions may simply be the feeling of authorship. Or it may be a complex of
experiences in which authorship experiences are only a component. But a better under-
standing of the brain mechanisms by which the feeling of uncompelledness is generated
will be crucial to understanding the component structure, if any, of this experience, as
well as whether, and under what conditions, the experience may fail to be fully veridical
in depicting the agent as originating and authoring an action.6
Suppose further investigation revealed that in paradigm cases in which an agent acts in
a putatively weak-willed manner, the feeling of uncompelledness is not veridical because
the agent is in some important sense compelled to act as she does. This sort of finding
would provide critical support for skepticism about weakness of will. A central reason for
dissatisfaction with the skeptical position that weak-willed actions do not really exist is, as
Mele correctly points out, that we seem to be acquainted with the fact of their existence
through first-person experience. Thus, an account of why first-person experience might
be systematically mistaken about the existence of weak-willed actions would do much to
loosen the grip of common sense, and thereby would significantly temper the dissatisfac-
tion with which the skeptical position is typically greeted.
Conclusion
In this article, I surveyed four key questions about willpower: How is willpower possible?
Why does willpower fail? How does willpower relate to other self-regulatory processes?
and What are the connections between willpower and weakness of will? As we have
seen, the topic of willpower is closely bound up with a number of important philosophi-
cal questions about human agency. While there is much we still do not know about will-
power, there is also justified excitement these days that as empirical investigations
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progress, we are coming ever closer to reaching satisfying answers to at least some of the
key questions posed in this article.
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Notes
* Correspondence: Departments of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 2215 Angell Hall, 435 South State Street,
Ann Arbor, MI 48109, USA. Email:sripada@umich.edu.
1 I thank Nishiten Shah for the helpful idea that the puzzle of synchronic self-control should be formulated as a
dilemma.
2 Dual-process models are one of a number of empirically supported frameworks available in cognitive psychology
that postulate that information processing is implemented by multiple-interacting psychological compartments. In
what follows, I illustrate the divided mind view of willpower using a dual-process framework, but recognize that
alternative frameworks for partitioning the mind might have also been used.
3 I develop a divided mind account of synchronic self-control and address these, as well as other questions raised
by the account, in ‘The puzzle of resistance and the divided mind’.
4 Recent studies suggest that self-regulatory processes are fueled by glucose (Gailliot and Baumeister), and pro-
longed engagement of these processes depletes glucose (Gailliot et al.; Masicampo and Baumeister). These studies
are tentative and await corroboration, but they are a good example of the type of findings that would help deepen
the analogy between willpower and muscular exertion, and would help support the view that there are fixed ceil-
ings in the efficacy of willpower that arise independent of one’s motivation to resist.
5 I use the term ‘weak-willed’ in place of Mele’s term ‘akratic’ in what follows.
6 In ‘An error theory of weakness of will’, I more fully develop an account that holds that weak-willed actions do
not exist, and that proposes that the error in common sense in believing they do exist arises from, inter alia, the mis-
leading subjective experiences characteristically associated with exercises of willpower.
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